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E

xplosive hazards pose a great threat to civilians in
Syria. A rapid return of displaced people usually occurs as soon as an area is declared newly taken. During

this period, there is limited medical and explosive clearance
capacity although there are high risks from explosive hazards,
including booby traps and improvised explosive devices (IED)
specifically targeting civilians in their homes. This article focuses on addressing the threat of explosive hazards in northern Syria and draws on risk education material designed by
humanitarian mine action organization DCA to target adult
returnees in Syria.

Syrian Context

Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, hun-

dreds of thousands of people have been killed. The United

IED risk education to recent returnees in northern Syria, 2016.
All graphics courtesy of DCA Syria.

Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

According to Action on Armed Violence (AoAV), Syria is one

(UNOCHA) estimates the conflict has displaced 11.3 million

of the states most affected by explosive violence, with 86 per-

people—6.3 million within Syria and 4.8 million as refugees.

cent of fatalities between 2011 and 2016 being civilians.4

Parties to the conflict repeatedly breach international humanitarian law and international human rights law. In some in-

The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) define an
IED as:

stances, civilians and civilian infrastructure appear to have

A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner in-

been directly targeted during attacks. The extensive use of ex-

corporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious,

plosive weapons during the six years of conflict poses a grave

incendiary, pyrotechnic materials or chemicals designed to

threat to Syrians, first responders, humanitarian operations,

destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They may incorporate

and livelihood activities. The situation in Syria is highly com-

military stores, but are normally devised from non-military

plex and constantly changing. This is illustrated by the map of

components.2

1

Syria in Figure 1 and the various actors controlling different

Almost any object can be made into an IED or a booby trap.

territories of the country as of 7 June 2017.

They can be found anywhere and are usually intended to be
undetectable and designed to target the unwary.

Explosive Contamination in Syria

A booby trap is defined by IMAS as:

Analysis of explosive contamination resulting from the

An explosive or non-explosive device, or other materi-

conflict in Syria has shown that the types of explosive weap-

al, deliberately placed to cause casualties when an appar-

ons used are varied and include landmines, various ordnance

ently harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act is

(e.g., artillery), cluster munitions, booby traps, and IEDs.

performed.2

2,3
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Figure 1. Territorial control of Syria by various actors as of 7 June 2017.

A few weeks after the end of the hostilities in Kobane,
northern Syria, a humanitarian worker described the situation as follows:

resulted in 70 fatalities.
The international community has stressed the ongoing crit-

The streets were littered with explosives – people had to

ical need for humanitarian mine action in Syria through risk

watch every step they took … as more families returned to

education and clearance.7,8 IMAS defines mine/ERW risk ed-

rebuild their lives, reports of incidents involving explosives

ucation as:

became a daily occurrence. Some victims made it to a medi-

Activities that seek to reduce the risk of death and injury

cal facility and survived, but many did not. It was devastat-

from mines and ERW, by raising awareness and promot-

ing to witness that for people who had already lost so much,

ing safe behavior. These activities include information ex-

there was still more to lose.

change with at-risk communities, communication of safety

5

It has been suggested that organized armed groups like the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have no intention of dis-

56

returning home to Al-Bab town on 24 February 2017, which

messages to target groups, and support for community risk
management and participation in mine action.2

tinguishing between civilians and combatants. Placing explo-

At this time there is debate within the mine action commu-

sive devices in residential homes and specifically targeting

nity whether the topic of IEDs (including IED risk education)

displaced populations planning to return home would strong-

should be mainstreamed throughout existing international

ly suggest attempts to create fear among the civilian and dis-

standards or whether a separate set of standards needs to be

placed population.6 This was evident from the attack ISIS

developed.9 It is DCA’s point of view that IED risk education

claimed on the displaced populations gathering to discuss

should be incorporated into existing international standards.
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Risk education to rubble clearers in northern Syria, 2016.

Rapid Return of Displaced Populations
to Newly Taken Areas
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) captured the city of

Menbij from ISIS on 12 August 2016. During ISIS’s control of

in mid-August 2016 but then appeared to drop significantly.
According to local authorities, this was a result of most residents returning to the city that month and then becoming
acutely aware of the risks posed by explosive devices.5

Menbij, explosive devices were planted in doorways, refriger-

In the Medecins Sans Frontieres’ (MSF) report, “Set to

ators, televisions, water taps, toys, and under clothes and mat-

Explode: Impact of Mines, Booby Traps and Explosive

tresses. Needs and Population Monitoring (an information

Remnants of War on Civilians in Northern Syria,” a resident

management tool that tracks and assesses the needs of dis-

from Jirn describes how his relative was killed when he re-

placed populations within Syria) estimated that 13,220 dis-

turned home. “In July 2015, he came back alone to check on

placed people returned between 13 August and 7 September

the situation before allowing his family to join him. When he

2016, increasing the total population of Menbij to 86,448 dur-

tried to open the door of his house, the whole house exploded.

Between August and

He died and his family has still not returned. He wasn’t the

September 2016 Human Rights Watch recorded 69 civilians

first one,” the resident said.5 It is evident that IEDs and boo-

who were killed by explosive devices in Menbij, 19 of which

by traps were placed by the departing organized armed group

were children.7

to target civilians, cause maximum damage, and create fear

ing the month of August in 2016.

10,11

Medical data relating to incidents that occurred in Menbij

amongst residents intending to return to their homes.

during August 2016 showed a dramatic increase in the num-

Land and property grabbing is a common issue within

ber of injuries related to blasts from explosive devices in the

emergency situations; and in the context of Syria, this ap-

last three weeks of the offensive, reaching a peak in the week

pears to be a significant concern amongst the displaced pop-

following the SDF’s announcement of their full control of the

ulation.12 The Global Protection Cluster (an organization

city when a large proportion of displaced people began rap-

dedicated to coordinating protection-related responses to

idly returning to the city. The high rate of injuries and deaths

displaced populations) reports that explosive hazards and

caused by explosive hazards in Menbij directly correlates with

housing, land, and property issues are within the top three

the returning of the displaced population. Incidents peaked

protection concerns for Syrians in 2017.13 This may explain the
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Risk education to children in northern Syria, 2015.

urgency for displaced populations in Syria wishing to return

than 68,000 at-risk boys, girls, men, and women using a vari-

to their homes as soon as they perceive it safe to do so.

ety of different modalities. Safety messages shared during di-

Risk education can support civilians returning to their

rect sessions were augmented by awareness raising campaigns

homes and their everyday routines. When areas are newly

using conventional media, such as radio and televison as well

taken and the displaced population chooses to return, there

as social media.

are limited health care facilities and inadequate medical

Needs and risk assessment. DCA has designed risk edu-

emergency assistance should an incident occur. Through rais-

cation campaigns for the Syria response based on needs and

ing awareness about the threats posed by explosive hazards,

risk assessments conducted within the targeted locations and

the risk of injury and death to civilians can be minimized.

via liaison with members of the mine action sub cluster and

Risk Education Campaigns
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United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Syria. Risk
education materials were pretested with the local population,

DCA began its humanitarian mine action activities in-

taking into consideration the local context in relation to the

side Syria through local implementing partners in 2014 and

appropriate language to be used and the conservative nature

directly in 2015. As well as clearance actvities in Kobane,

of the area. DCA developed an internal monitoring and evalu-

DCA conducted risk education activities and campaigns in

ation system to conduct quality assurance and quality control

Al Ladhiqiyah, Idlib, Aleppo, Ar Raqqah, and Al Hassakah

in the locations where risk education is delivered.

governorates in northern Syria. In 2016, DCA provided

Adult returnee risk education material. DCA’s risk edu-

tailor-made and audience-specific risk education to more

cation campaign includes designing material specifically to
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Risk education material should also provide information on
what to do if suspicious items are found. However, the clearance capacity within Syria is limited and varies between geographical locations. Another consideration is that the power
dynamics are frequently shifting at the local level. For these
reasons it was decided the simple message report to the local
authority if suspicious items were found would be used. This
information will hopefully direct reports of suspicious items
to clearance assistance if it is available locally while remaining nonpartisan.
The IED threat and the approach required for IED risk education varies in different countries, contexts, and periods of
time. Risk education campaigns in Syria should be tailored for
the geographical area, specific target group, and phase of the
conflict. Messages and materials that are currently considered
appropriate will need to be reviewed as the context evolves.
Risk education, including raising awareness of IEDs and booby traps is crucial to the humanitarian response in Syria in order to minimize the number of fatalities or injuries caused by
explosive hazards to displaced and returning civilians.
See endnotes page 67

Figure 2. Adult returnee poster.
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in Syria involves landmines, unexploded ordnance (UXO),
booby traps, and IEDs, or a combination of these explosive
items; as a result, risk education materials targeting adult returnees have been designed to include all explosive threats.
As seen in Figure 2, the different categories of explosive items
are distinguished on the poster. Considering the limited time
and opportunities that were available to target those returning home, this was considered the most efficient and effective
approach to raising awarness about the threats posed by explosive hazards.
For the risk education materials, all photographs were taken of explosive items from relevant areas in Syria, including
IEDs. While any object can be made into an IED, and the designs are continually evolving, images of IEDs relevant to the
geographical location and time period were provided. The
text above the IED images clarifies that these are only some
examples, highlighting that these are not an exhaustive representation of IEDs. This is similar to displaying images of
explosive remnants of war (ERW) on risk education material, as it is not possible to illustrate all of the different colors,
materials, sizes, and shapes of explosive hazards that could
pose a risk.
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